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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1066 
 ___________ 
 
 RIAZ TALUKDER, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                         Respondent 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A093-119-831 ) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 ( filed: June 14, 2011 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Riaz Talukder, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions for review of an order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that denied his motion to reopen or 
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reconsider.  We will deny the petition for review. 
 Talukder was placed in removal proceedings in 1998 because he attempted to 
enter the United States without being in possession of proper documents.  Talukder 
admitted that he was removable, but applied for asylum and related relief.  Talukder‟s 
claims were based on his allegation that he had been, and would be, persecuted by 
members of his wife‟s family, who were part of the Jamaat e-Islami political party.  He 
alleged that the wife‟s family members, along with about ten others,  severely beat his 
father and him in 1986 after he proposed marriage, because the wife‟s family believed 
that he had turned away from religion; that he was not a good Muslim.  A.R. 487-88; 653.  
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief.  A.R. 395.  Taluder appealed.  In a decision 
dated September 9, 2002, the BIA “determine[d] that [Talukder] was credible,” and that 
he “fear[ed] persecution from his in-laws because they are religious fanatics.”  A.R. 352.  
The BIA assumed for the sake of appeal that his attackers sought to harm him, at least in 
part, on account of religious grounds, and that the harm rose to the level of persecution.  
Id.  The BIA denied relief, however, because Talukder had not shown that the 
government was unwilling or unable to protect him from his wife‟s family.  Id.  The BIA 
also noted that Talukder had not shown that he would be unable to relocate within 
Bangladesh to avoid future persecution.  A.R. 353.  Talukder did not petition for review 
of this decision. 
 Nearly eight years later, Talukder filed a motion to reopen, seeking asylum, 
withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) 
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based on changed country conditions.  Talukder alleged that the changes included 
“increased fundamentalist activity, the growth of Taliban groups country wide, the 
growth of any-western [sic] hatred and the increase in the ability of these Islamic groups 
to harm and injure [Talukder] and his family at the provocation of [his] wife‟s family, 
along with the police and government‟s willingness or inability to stop the hatred.”  A.R. 
101. 
 In an October 8, 2010 decision, the BIA denied the motion.  The BIA recognized 
that a showing of material and previously unavailable changed country conditions would 
excuse the untimeliness of the motion to reopen, but determined that Talukder had “not 
specified how conditions have changed since his 1999 hearing.”  A.R. 89.  The BIA 
noted that, in particular, Talukder had failed to address the conclusion in the BIA‟s 
previous opinion that he had “failed to demonstrate that the police were unable or 
unwilling to protect him,” and that he had “otherwise failed to present evidence that 
„changed conditions‟ exist in Bangladesh which would materially affect his claim.”  Id.  
Talukder did not petition for review of this decision. 
 Instead, about a month later, Talukder filed a motion requesting reconsideration.  
With his motion, he included eleven exhibits, including current country reports, 
documentation of injuries he received in 1996, documentation to support an allegation 
that one of his brothers was beaten by his wife‟s family in 2002, documentation of an 
alleged attack on another brother by his wife‟s family in 2009, and affidavits regarding 
the notoriety of his wife‟s family and the fact that they are related to the current Minister 
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of Communications. 
The BIA noted that Talukder did not identify any specific error in the BIA‟s 
October 8, 2010 order, and did not point out any change of law.  The BIA thus denied the 
motion to reconsider.
1
  Acknowledging the numerous attachments, the BIA also 
considered the motion as a motion to reopen.  The BIA first noted that the motion was 
“both untimely and barred by numerical limitations.”  A.R.  3.  The BIA again recognized 
that the time limitations (and numerical limitations) do not apply to a motion to reopen 
“based on changed country conditions, if such evidence is material and was not available 
and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”  Id.  The BIA 
stated, however, that Talukder had “not indicated why these documents [attached to the 
motion] were not included in his prior motion,” that he had “not articulate[d] any 
changed conditions” since the October 8, 2010 order, and that he also had “not 
demonstrated any changed country conditions which would materially affect his claim for 
asylum in 1999.”  Id.  The BIA further stated that Talukder had produced insufficient 
evidence to alter the IJ‟s 1999 finding that “[Talukder] had failed to demonstrate that any 
fear he maintained of his in-laws was based on one of the five protected grounds.”  A.R. 
4.  Talukder filed a timely, counseled petition for review. 
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s December 28, 2010 order in which it 
                                                 
1
 Talukder does not challenge this portion of the decision. 
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refused to reopen or reconsider the case.
2
  Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010).  
Our standard of review is narrow:  we review the BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen or 
reconsider for abuse of discretion.  Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005).  
The BIA‟s decision is entitled to “broad deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 
396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted), and it “will not be 
disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
In his brief, Talukder argues that in determining whether country conditions had changed, 
the BIA erred in considering the time since the previous motion to reopen, instead of the 
time since the proceedings before the IJ; that the BIA contradicted itself by saying that he 
had not demonstrated that his fear was based on a protected ground; and that it erred in 
failing to find that he made out a prima facie case for relief.
3
 
 We agree that the “change” in country conditions that will excuse an otherwise 
untimely motion to reopen is measured from the time that the hearing before the IJ took 
                                                 
2
 We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA‟s removal order of September 9, 2002, 
and its October 8, 2010 order denying Talukder‟s first motion to reopen because Talukder 
did not file timely petitions for review of those orders.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) 
(providing for 30-day deadline in which to file petition for review); Stone v. INS, 514 
U.S. 386, 395 (1995) (motion to reopen or reconsider does not toll time to file petition for 
review of BIA‟s underlying removal order).   
 
3
 Talukder also argues that he showed he was likely to be tortured if he returned to 
Bangladesh.  We agree with the Government that we lack jurisdiction to consider this 
argument, as Talukder did not raise any claim regarding possible torture in his second 
motion to reopen.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  
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place.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2006).  Nevertheless, we do not 
believe that the BIA abused its discretion in considering that the evidence Talukder 
sought to introduce could have been included with his previous motion to reopen, where 
that motion was based on the same claim, and the same alleged change in country 
conditions propounded in his second motion to reopen.  We do not believe that Congress 
anticipated that when an alien‟s first motion to reopen failed because he failed to meet his 
burden of establishing a prima facie case, he could continue to file serial motions to 
reopen, based on the same claim and same changes in country conditions, but seeking to 
introduce new evidence.  
We also agree that the BIA may have erred in relying on the IJ‟s finding that 
Talukder “had failed to demonstrate that any fear he maintained of his in-laws was based 
on one of the five protected grounds” where, in contrast, in its decision on appeal it had 
assumed for the sake of appeal that his attackers sought to harm him, at least in part, on 
account of religious grounds, and that the harm rose to the level of persecution.  
However, any error was of no consequence, as we agree with the BIA‟s alternative 
holding that Talukder had “not demonstrated any changed country conditions which 
would materially affect his claim for asylum in 1999.”  The only changes in country 
conditions that Talukder indicated were that the Awami League party had come into 
power in Bangladesh and that the current Minister of Communications of Bangladesh is 
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related to his wife‟s family.4   
However, whether the political change would make any change in the probability 
that Talukder would be persecuted is somewhat unclear from the evidence he submitted.  
For example, an affidavit from the Rajihar Union Parisad Chairman stated that 
Talukder‟s wife‟s family “is always supported and protected” and that the “police . . . do 
not do anything about the malicious acts committed by” the family “when the BNP party 
is in power.”  The affiant opined that now that “the Awami League party is in power . . . 
you would think that this would cut down [the wife‟s family‟s] power because the Awami 
League party has suppressed Islamic fundamentalists and generally brought them under 
control by arresting them for causing trouble”  but that the wife‟s family is  “a very well 
politically connected family and as such [it] yield[s] more power under the current 
government then [sic] [it] did before.”  A.R. 73.  But if Talukder‟s in-laws proceeded 
with impunity before the Awami League party came into power, it is not clear how the 
political change can constitute a material change in country conditions.  We thus find that 
the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
 
                                                 
4
 Talukder included an affidavit from someone related to his wife‟s father who 
indicated that the Communications Minister is “from the same family” as Talukder‟s 
father-in-law, but the affidavit does not indicate what the relationship is. 
